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Immigration, National Identity and Political Trust in European Democracies 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper argues that discrepancies between individual-level conceptualizations of national 
identity and official government approaches to national identity, as reflected in policies 
towards migrants, contribute to reduced levels of political trust in Europe. Public opinion data 
matched with contextual data measuring immigrant incorporation policies are used to 
investigate this proposition. The findings indicate that individuals who take a more exclusive 
approach to national identity but live in political systems that are comparatively more 
welcoming of immigrant incorporation into the national political system tend to be the least 
trusting of their political systems, and this is closely followed by those individuals who adopt 
a more inclusive form of identity but live in countries that are relatively less welcoming in 
their treatment of immigrants. Where individual identity and immigrant incorporation are 
both inclusive, trust tends to be relatively high. 
 
 
Keywords: immigration, trust, national identity, public opinion 
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Long-term immigration to Europe has brought public and legal conceptualizations of national 
identity under the spotlight, leading many individuals and policymakers to try to gain a firm 
grasp on what it means to be a true country-national. While existing research shows that 
ethnic and exclusionary forms of national identity may be reducing trust in politics (Berg and 
Hjerm 2010; McLaren 2015), this paper argues that an important factor to be considered in 
this relationship is government policy regarding the treatment of migrants. It is contended 
here that when governments make decisions about the nature of national identity that are then 
reflected in national legislation regarding the treatment of newcomers—migrants—this has 
the potential to create considerable dissatisfaction. This is because there is likely to be a 
disconnect between national identity conceptions held by many ordinary citizens and the 
vision of national identity that is reflected in national legislation regarding the treatment of 
migrants. The paper’s argument is investigated using public opinion data from large-scale 
immigrant receiving countries (West and Southern Europe) matched with contextual data 
measuring these countries’ treatment of migrants. Below, we outline our argument in greater 
detail before discussing how the argument will be investigated and the results of our analysis. 
 
National Identity and Political Trust 
Research on national identity notes significant differences in the way individuals or countries 
as a whole understand their national identities. Early work on this topic developed a binary 
classification of countries into ethnic versus civic nations (Kohn 1944), with later research 
adding factors like culture (Shulman 2002; see also Ariely 2011; Pehrson, Vignoles and 
Brown 2009; but see Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Bruter 2003) and developing other 
classifications (see Hjerm 1998a, 1998b; Kunovic 2009; see the overview in Baycroft and 
Hewitson 2006). The purpose of this paper is not to revisit these classifications; instead, our 
focus is on the implications of inclusive and exclusive national identity constructions for 
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political trust in the age of migration.
1
 Why and how do we expect these to be connected, 
though? 
 
Some conceptualizations of national identities emphasize factors like ancestry and long-
standing connections to the country while others tend to emphasize a more civic, 
participatory approach (see Baycroft and Hewitson 2006). In the former, the state and its 
political institutions are thought to exist to represent and make decisions on behalf of a 
national community with shared ancestry and lengthy connections (which may, of course, be 
‘imagined’—Anderson 1991). In the modern context of large-scale immigration, this 
exclusive conceptualization of national identity raises difficult questions about whether and 
how immigrants and their descendants ever become part of the democratic polity. Existing 
research contends that these sorts of understandings of national identity are likely to be 
fundamentally out of line with the actual functioning of national political systems, in that 
immigrants have become incorporated into these political systems to a greater or lesser 
extent; thus, these more exclusive national identities are thought to be undermining public 
confidence in government institutions that have made immigrant incorporation possible in the 
first place (McLaren 2015).  
 
There are, however, potentially more inclusive ways of seeing national identity. The more 
civic conceptualizations of national identity are said to emphasize citizenship, individual 
                                                          
1
 The conceptualization of political trust is the subject of a large body of academic research. Due to space 
limitations, we do not review the conceptualization of ‘political trust’ or political system support; for 
discussions of these concepts, see Levi and Stoker (2000), the essays in Braithwaite and Levi (1998), Miller and 
Listhaug (1990, 1999), and Weatherford (1992), to name a few. Political trust is conceptualized in this paper as 
‘a summary judgment that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant 
scrutiny’ (Miller and Listhaug 1990:358).  
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rights and obligations and connections to the political system and its rules and norms. For 
instance, Habermas (1992) proposed the idea that people should be unified by a political 
attachment to the norms and values of a pluralistic liberal democratic constitution and that a 
political community can be created by ‘the practices of citizens who exercise their rights to 
participation’ (Habermas 1996: 495). Thus, some may perceive that one important way to 
become a country-national includes the act of taking part in the political community, for 
instance, by participating in choosing political representatives and joining political or 
voluntary associations (see the review essay by Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005). From this 
perspective, a person may not share long-standing connections to a country and may not be of 
the same ethnicity or heritage as the majority, but loyalty to the state can still be developed 
through this alternative route of political incorporation. This view of national identity is likely 
to be more open to the possibility of settlement and incorporation of immigrant-origin 
minorities in comparison to the types of identity that emphasize shared ancestry and lengthy 
connections (Wright 2011a, 2011b; Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown 2009). This implies that 
individuals who see national identity in civic terms are likely to have a more welcoming view 
towards immigrant incorporation into national political systems. Existing research points to 
the conclusion that this more inclusive understanding of national identity does indeed 
translate into more positive feelings about national political systems (McLaren 2015).  An 
alternative way of viewing the potential connection between civic identity and political trust 
is that the former is more closely related to the state (Berg and Hjerm 2010). 
 
Government Migrant Policies 
We contend that government policy towards migrants is crucial to understanding how 
national identity might translate into political trust and distrust. Extensive adoption of 
multicultural policies has been shown to magnify the degree to which hostility to immigration 
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translates into reduced political system support; such policies are argued to challenge 
primordial conceptions of national identity, leading to ‘a jaundiced view of a political system’ 
that has developed these policies (Citrin, Levy and Wright 2014: 1535). Though existing 
research explores the connection between attitudes to immigration, government migrant 
policies and political trust, it is national identity constructions that are at the heart of the 
argument about these relationships.  
 
Here, we investigate the specific question of whether government policies that are out of sync 
with individual understandings of national identity do indeed produce more negative 
perceptions of government institutions. We also focus on the more participatory aspects of 
national identity than most existing research on this topic (see below). Furthermore, we 
examine the impact of government migrant policy on the translation of national identity into 
political trust using a more expansive set of policy indicators than has been the case in 
existing research on related topics.  
 
We argue that government policies emphasizing a more inclusionary, participatory approach 
to national identity in the treatment of newcomers—migrants—are interacting with more 
exclusive conceptions of national identity to produce reduced levels of trust in national 
governments. Similarly, we contend that individuals who emphasize a potentially more 
inclusionary, participatory approach to national identity may also believe in the importance of 
granting this route to citizenship to newcomers and may be dissatisfied by government policy 
that takes a more exclusive approach to dealing with newcomers. In both of these cases, the 
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failure of government policy to reflect national identity preferences is likely to lead to 
alienation from government and thus decreased levels of political trust. 2  
 
There are a range of policy areas that fit within our conceptualization of migrant policies. 
Broadly speaking, when referring to migrant policies we mean the policies that govern the 
treatment of individuals who have been accepted as immigrants to a host country for the 
purposes of work or family reunification, and specifically policies dealing with their 
integration and incorporation into society and politics (see Hammar 1985). The specific 
policies of concern to us include citizenship policies, which in some countries make it 
comparatively more difficult for migrants to become fully functioning members of the 
political community, with longer waiting periods, stricter language requirements, and higher 
naturalization fees to acquire citizenship (e.g., Howard 2009). In essence, what is being 
reflected in these more restrictive policies is a relatively more exclusive notion of national 
identity compared, for instance, to countries where waiting periods for naturalization are 
                                                          
2
 Some may contend that the relationships outlined here are also connected to the mobilizing activities of far-
right parties. We have investigated the relationships shown below, controlling for the presence of a popular far-
right party, including interacting this variable with emphasis on exclusive national identity, and with emphasis 
on inclusive national identity. The results indicated that far-right parties did not appear to be mobilizing 
particular kinds of national identity to affect political trust one way or another and that when government 
migrant policy is also included in the model, any potential far-right effect is not statistically significant. That is, 
it appears to be government policy rather than the far-right that is most relevant, though we acknowledge that 
far-right parties are likely to be playing a role in the design of government policies toward immigrants (directly 
or indirectly). 
        We have also investigated the effects of several other potential country-level control variables, including 
the World Bank’s governance scores, immigration levels, and economic variables such as unemployment and 
GDP/capita, and none of these affected the relationships described below. Due to limited degrees of freedom at 
the country level we focus on our key country-level contextual variable, government migrant policy. 
8 
 
shorter, language requirements are less onerous, and fees for naturalization are lower. 
Policies regarding family reunification may also be more or less inclusive, for instance, 
allowing family members to join the migrant after a shorter or longer period of holding a 
residence permit, allowing family members to join the migrant before or only after passing a 
language test, etc.  
 
Also included within the category of migrant policies for the purposes of this paper are 
policies that might be referred to as multiculturalism policies, namely those policies that ‘go 
beyond the protection of the basic civil and political rights guaranteed to all individuals in a 
liberal-democratic state, to also extend some level of public recognition and support for 
ethnocultural minorities to maintain and express their distinct identities and practices’ 
(Banting and Kymlicka 2006: 1). Examples of these types of policies include constitutional or 
legislative affirmation of multiculturalism, adopting multiculturalism in the school 
curriculum, funding ethnic group organisations and cultural activities, and funding bilingual 
education or mother-tongue instruction, to name a few. These multiculturalism policies as 
well as the more welcoming citizenship policies are likely to be seen as direct threats to 
exclusive forms of national identity; as a consequence, those holding such identities and 
living in countries that have adopted these more welcoming policies are expected to be 
relatively distrusting of governments, as the latter are likely to be blamed for adopting 
policies seen to be undermining fundamental national values (Citrin, Levy and Wright 2014).   
 
Likewise, individuals who see national identity in a more inclusive, civic manner that 
emphasizes the importance of participation for becoming a true country national but live in 
countries that makes this route to incorporation more difficult are equally likely to feel 
dissatisfied with the official government policy towards migrants, which is out of line with 
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these individuals’ perceptions of national identity. As outlined above, existing research has 
shown that individuals taking this more civic approach to national identity tend to be more 
welcoming towards migrants and are more likely to see migrants as enriching national 
culture. For these individuals, there is likely to be a considerable amount of dissatisfaction 
when government policies towards migrants are relatively unwelcoming—i.e., they make 
citizenship difficult to obtain, discourage family reunification, and discourage immigrant 
participation in the political system as a route to becoming a country-national. 
 
Note that we are not arguing that most citizens will be familiar with the intimate details of 
migrant policy, but we do contend that citizens are likely to have a rough idea about what 
characteristics are emphasized by official policy. As argued by Weldon (2006: 335), 
‘government policies…serve as a starting point for public discourse on ethnic minorities’. 
One indication that people are aware of government policies in this area is that mass publics 
living in countries that adopt the more multicultural-oriented policies such as those described 
above appear to have become increasingly exclusive in their definitions of their national 
communities (Wright 2011a); additionally, as noted above, multiculturalism policies are 
themselves affecting political system support (Citrin, Levy and Wright 2014). Moreover, 
Bustikova (2014) finds that immigrant incorporation into political systems increases voting 
for far-right parties. That is, there is evidence that mass publics are aware of, and are 
responding to, government policymaking in this area (on multicultural policy and public 
opinion see also Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Banting et al 2006; on public responsiveness to 
immigration policy outputs, see Jennings 2009).  
 
It should also be acknowledged that citizen views on national identity may themselves be 
putting pressure on government migrant policy and vice versa.  An empirical examination of 
10 
 
this possibility would take us beyond the scope of the paper, and as noted above, existing 
research has already established that citizen attitudes to immigration and perceptions of 
national identity do appear to be responding to government policy—i.e., at least some part of 
the relationship between these variables is in the direction of public opinion responding to 
government policy. Moreover, government policies regarding immigrant incorporation will 
likely be deemed to be inconsistent with some individuals’ perceptions of national identity 
because these policies cannot necessarily be responsive to the views of the population as a 
whole, which in European countries tends to be divided regarding what the key 
characteristics or attributes of national identity are (see, for instance, McLaren 2015: chapter 
2). 
 
Measurement of Key Variables  
We use Eurobarometer 71.3 (EB71.3), from June-July 2009, to investigate the individual-
level portion of our argument. This data set was selected because it is one of the few cross-
national data sets containing survey items about national identity and about perceptions of the 
political system within the same survey.  Note that we also considered including an analysis 
of the 2008 European Values Survey (EVS), which contains potentially relevant indicators of 
our key individual level variables. However, one of the main ideas emphasized in this paper 
is the importance of the voluntary and participatory aspects of civic identity. That is, some 
individuals are likely to perceive that the route to becoming a true country-national is through 
active participation in politics and/or civil society. Unfortunately, the indicators of 
conceptualizations of national identity that were contained within in the EVS do not include 
these participatory aspects. Instead, the closest equivalent is ‘respect for [country]’s political 
institutions and laws’, which is not quite the same as participation in politics and 
associational life; moreover, our dependent variable is trust in various political institutions, 
11 
 
and there is likely to be considerable overlap between the latter and contending that ‘respect 
for [country]’s political institutions and laws’ is an important component of national identity 
(see Berg and Hjerm 2010).  We thus do not include the EVS in our analyses here, but we 
note that we have analysed the relationships investigated here using the EVS and the 
conclusions drawn from those analyses are very similar to those drawn based on the EB data.
3
 
 
Our dependent variable, political trust, is measured with the following items: ‘I would like to 
ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the 
following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. Justice\ the 
(NATIONALITY) legal system, Political parties, The (NATIONALITY PARLIAMENT) 
(USE PROPER NAME FOR LOWER HOUSE), The (NATIONALITY) Government’.  The 
response choices are ‘tend to trust’ or ‘tend not to trust’. ‘Don’t know’ responses were also 
coded and these were placed between ‘tend to trust’ and ‘tend not to trust’, with ‘tend not to 
trust’ coded as 0, ‘tend to trust’ coded as 1, and ‘don’t know’ coded as 0.5.4  Responses to 
these items are strongly correlated with one another (according to both Kendall’s tau-b and 
Spearman’s rho) and load onto a single factor in a principle components analysis in every 
country; scalability coefficients from an Item Response Theory (IRT) model, or Mokken 
scale, also indicate the existence of a very strong scale, and average Cronbach’s alpha is 0.81 
(the lowest alpha was 0.67 for France and the highest was 0.85 for Italy). In addition, prior 
                                                          
3
 Comments received by the authors regarding whether or not to include the EVS results have been extremely 
conflicting; given the degree of potential overlap between the most clearly civic EVS item—respect for laws 
and political institutions—and our dependent variable—trust in political institutions—we have decided to omit 
these results. 
4
 We have also investigated the relationships shown below without the respondents who said ‘don’t know’, and 
there were only minor differences in the y-intercepts but almost no differences in the strength of relationships 
reported below. 
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research on attitudes toward the components of political systems indicates a strong 
connection between these (Hooghe 2011; but see Denters, Gabriel and Torcal 2007; Fisher, 
van Heerde and Tucker 2010). We, therefore, combine these items into a single additive 
index, with high values representing higher levels of political trust.  The range for the 
political trust scale was standardized to 0-10. 
  
The characteristics of national identity emphasized by respondents are measured with the 
following survey items: ‘People differ in what they think it means to be (NATIONALITY). 
In your view, among the following, what do you think are the most important characteristics 
to be (NATIONALITY) (MAXIMUM OF 3 ANSWERS)? (1) To be a Christian; (2) To share 
(NATIONALITY) cultural traditions;  (3) To be born in (OUR COUNTRY); (4) To have at 
least one (NATIONALITY) parents; (5) To feel (NATIONALITY); (6) To master 
(COUNTRY LANGUAGE) (OR FOR MULTILANGUAGE COUNTRIES) (7) To master 
one of the official languages of (OUR COUNTRY); (8) To exercise citizens’ rights, for 
example voting in (OUR COUNTRY); (9) To have been brought up in (OUR COUNTRY); 
(10) Being active in any association or organization in (OUR COUNTRY)’.   
 
Our discussion of national identity thus far has distinguished between inclusive and exclusive 
identity, with factors like ethnicity, ancestry, and lengthy ties to the country being more 
exclusive (Shulman 2002) and the more inclusive factors being civic aspects of national 
identity.
5
 None of the Eurobarometer items above asks specifically about ethnicity or 
                                                          
5
 We acknowledge that particularly at the country level, civic national identity may be exclusive to the extent 
that in many countries, citizenship is a requirement for participation and is difficult to obtain. At the individual 
level, though, we contend that the civic understanding of national identity as conceptualized here is relatively 
more inclusive than emphasizing factors over which the individual has no control whatsoever (e.g., parentage 
and amount of time spent in the country).  
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ancestry, and so we revert to the more general notion of ascriptive characteristics, which are 
characteristics over which the individual has no control. Following on from the work of other 
scholars in this field (Kunovich 2009; Wright 2011a; Wright, Citrin and Wand 2012; Tilley, 
Exley and Heath 2004; Heath and Tilley 2005), respondents who chose items 3, 4, or 9 might 
be assumed to emphasize ascriptive identity while respondents who chose items 8 or 10 
might be assumed to emphasize civic identity. Because of the forced choice nature of this 
survey question, investigating whether these items go together empirically is not possible 
with standard techniques like factor analysis. We can note, however, that as part of a separate 
project we have conducted a pilot study amongst UK university students that includes many 
of the above items, as well as items found in the International Social Survey Programme  
(ISSP) module on National Identity (which unfortunately does not contain items measuring 
political trust or an equivalent). That pilot study uses a similar response format to the ISSP 
national identity questions: respondents are asked to note how important each attribute is to 
their own understanding of their national identity. This study is discussed further in the Web 
Appendix. In a factor analysis of the items included in our pilot study, items similar to items 
3, 4, and 9 above do, in fact, load onto a single factor, along with a more clearly ethnic 
item—ancestry—which was not included in the EB survey but is in our pilot study. This 
would seem to indicate that items 3, 4, and 9 are tapping into similar perceptions of national 
identity as ancestry. In our pilot study, our more participatory items load onto a separate 
factor.  
 
Moreover, in analyses of surveys in which respondents rate each item in turn, such as the 
International Social Survey Programme data, birthplace is generally shown to load onto the 
same factor as ancestry (e.g., Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Heath, Martin and Spreckelsen. 
2009); in cross-national analysis, having lived in the country for most of one’s life—the 
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closest equivalent to Item 9 (having been brought up on the country)—also loads onto this 
same factor (Heath, Martin and Spreckelsen 2009). Though parentage has not been included 
in surveys like the ISSP, it seems likely that this item also captures the more exclusive ethnic 
form of national identity. Additionally, while  Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) find the items on 
speaking the language and feeling like a country national to fit onto a civic identity scale that 
also includes respect for political institutions and laws, Heath, Martin and Spreckelsen’s 
(2009) cross-country analysis shows that there are cross-national differences in the extent to 
which this item is likely to measure civic identity. Given that Items 8 and 10 in the EB 
questionnaire appear to more clearly tap into the participatory nature of national identity 
emphasized here, we use these as our indicators of civic identity.  
 
In order to carry out the multivariate analyses below, we investigated different ways of 
combining the above EB items to make the results for different national identity constructs as 
comparable as possible. Because we only have two items that are clearly civic in nature in the 
EB, it seemed reasonable to try to narrow our exclusive (ascriptive/ethnic) items down to two 
as well. Since birthplace and parentage clearly loaded most strongly with ancestry in the 
factor analysis in our pilot study (see the Web Appendix), we focus on these as our indicators 
of exclusive identity. Initially, we constructed two separate indices—an inclusive (non-
ascriptive/civic) index that includes the two participation-oriented items and an exclusive 
(ascriptive/ethnic) index that includes emphasis on parentage and birthplace. The results 
using these two separate constructs are shown in Web Appendix Table 2. Note that in these 
analyses, each construct has been entered into separate regression equations—i.e., they are 
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not both included in the same regression simultaneously due to concerns about 
multicollinearity.
6
 
 
For the main text of the paper, in order to simplify the analysis and presentation of results we 
have combined the national identity items to create a single national identity index. For this 
index, individuals who mentioned both parentage and birthplace were given a score of -2, 
those who mentioned one or the other of these were given a score of -1, those who mentioned 
both of the participation items were given a score of +2 and those who mentioned one of 
these were given a score of +1. Those who chose none of the participation or ascriptive/ethnic 
items were scored 0.
7
 There is some ambiguity regarding where to place individuals who 
                                                          
6
 There is disagreement within academic literature regarding whether civic and ethnic identity are actually 
distinct from one another. Wright, Citrin and Wand contend that ‘whether an individual is ascriptive or civic 
minded in their conceptualization of national identity…can be conceived of as a continuum, but it is generally 
thought that there is a meaningful dichotomy of outlooks that it is important to capture’ (2012:  476). While 
research based on ISSP data finds civic and ethnic identity to be relatively strongly correlated, Wright, Citrin 
and Wand (2012) convincingly show that this may be an artefact of the approach to measuring national identity 
used in the ISSP, and that a ranking approach better captures the distinctiveness of civic and ethnic/ascriptive 
identity. Though the measure of national identity used here is not exactly a ranking measure, it does require 
respondents to consider their priorities when it comes to national identity and is the closest cross-national survey 
to use the ranking measure that Wright, Citrin and Wand (2012) advocate. 
7
 Heath, Martin and Spreckelsen ’s (2009) analysis of ISSP data indicates potentially significant cross-national 
differences in the type of national identity each of the ISSP items is capturing, with some items failing to load 
onto the ‘correct’ factor in some countries. The most problematical cases in their study are countries that are not 
included in our analysis (USA, Israel, Chile, Poland and the Czech Republic). These authors do identify some 
problematical items for countries that are included in our analyses, but in almost all cases, these refer to survey 
items that we do not use in our own analyses. For instance Heath et al find that the religion item is problematical 
in Portugal and that in Ireland the language item loads negatively onto the ethnic identity factor. We do not use 
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chose one participation and one ascriptive/ethnic item. Based on the analysis of Wright, 
Citrin and Wand (2012), we initially considered trying to place these individuals towards the 
ascriptive side of the scale, as these authors contend ‘that there really are only two types of 
respondents: those who are “pure” civic nationalists and the rest, who are more ascriptive’ 
(2012: 477). However, their analyses are from the USA, which Heath, Martin and 
Spreckelsen (2009) identify as being one of the potentially problematical cases in cross-
national measurements of national identity. Theoretically, it seemed that these individuals 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
either of these items, and Heath et al ’s analysis would seem to provide additional justification for not using 
these items in cross-national analyses like the ones conducted in this paper.  
The most problematical case in the Heath et al results for the analyses conducted in this paper would 
seem to be Spain, where items such as birthplace, living in the country all of one’s life, and respecting the 
institutions and laws of the country tend to load onto the same factor, with ancestry loading far more weakly 
onto this same (first) factor but also showing some connection to a second factor. The analysis conducted by 
Wright et al (2012) for the U.S. points us to the potential conclusion that the results for Spain could be an 
artefact of the measurement of national identity in the ISSP, in that the ratings method used in the ISSP may not 
always adequately capture the distinctiveness of ethnic and civic identity. For the case of Spain, we have 
investigated the relationship between our national identity scale and our dependent variable, political trust, to 
see if the relationship between these is substantially different than in other countries included in our analysis and 
found that—as would have been expected based on existing analyses (Berg and Hjerm 2010; McLaren 2015)—
greater emphasis on civic identity is associated with higher political trust. We have also reanalyzed our 
multilevel results with Spain omitted, and the relationships reported here are similar to those that exclude Spain. 
As one final robustness check on our measure of national identity, we have reanalyzed the 
Eurobarometer data focusing on one of the key items we have used to measure the ethnic side of the scale—
birthplace--which loads onto the ethnic identification scale in every ISSP country from Heath et al which is also 
included in our analysis. That is, we have reanalyzed the relationships investigated in the paper using the 
birthplace item as our sole measure of emphasis on ethnic identification and using the participating in politics 
item as our sole measure of civic identity. The results still show a significant interactive effect between migrant 
policy and national identity, as is the case with the results reported below. 
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might be counted as having neither clearly ascriptive or civic identities and could feasibly be 
placed in the middle of our ascriptive-civic national identity scale. Before placing these 
individuals in this location, we examined the mean levels of political trust for individuals 
located on each point on the ascriptive-civic national identity scale and compared these mean 
scores to the mean level of trust for those who had mixed identities. In terms of levels of 
trust, the means for the latter group were closest to the centre-point on the ascriptive-civic 
scale (political trust mean for those at the centre of the ascriptive-civic scale=4.32, SD=3.83; 
for those with mixed national identities, the mean for political trust is 4.23, SD=3.80), and so 
we have analysed the data with the group with mixed identities placed at this point on the 
scale. For the purposes of our analysis, we have therefore placed them in centre of the 
ascriptive-civic scale (at 0). The scale ranges from -2 to +2 (exclusive/ascriptive/ethnic to 
inclusive/non-ascriptive/civic).
8
 
 
As noted above, our measure of civic identity gauges the individual’s emphasis on 
participation in civic organizations and voting rather respecting laws and political institutions, 
which has been used as an indicator of civic identity in several other studies of public 
perceptions of national identity (see the discussion in the Web Appendix). While the latter is 
likely to produce a high amount of automatic correlation between civic identity and 
perceptions of national political systems, we contend that the more participatory and 
voluntary approach to civic identity does not necessarily imply automatic positive 
perceptions of political institutions.  
                                                          
8
 Our preliminary analyses have also investigated the effects of emphasis on culture, language and religion 
separately and found these to have very limited effects on political trust. Given this information and the cross-
national variability in the connection of these items to civic versus ethnic identity reported in footnote 7, we 
have omitted analysis of emphasis on these items from this paper. 
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our key variables for the countries included in our 
analysis. With regard to the latter, our analysis focuses on older countries of immigration, 
particularly West and Southern Europe, excluding the newer democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe.  The former group of countries includes those that have received relatively 
large numbers of immigrants in the past 70 years (e.g., Castles, de Haas and Miller 2013), 
and it is these immigrant-receiving countries to which we expect our arguments to apply. We 
do not necessarily expect the relationships discussed in this paper to hold for the newer 
democracies, which are also much newer countries of immigration and until recently have not 
received immigrants in the large numbers experienced by the rest of Europe. That is, their 
national identities are less likely to have been challenged by the sort of immigration to which 
we refer (i.e., rather than, for instance, immigration from neighbouring countries), and the 
notion of blaming political institutions for large-scale immigration is not yet likely to be 
applicable in these cases.
9
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 1, the countries in which political trust is highest include Denmark, 
Austria, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands; political trust is lowest in Great Britain and 
five of the countries that can be argued to have suffered the most in the Eurozone crisis—
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland. Political trust is also comparatively low in 
Belgium and France. Moreover, deviation from these average scores is fairly high. These 
                                                          
9
 Also of relevance is that there appear to be cross-national differences in the extent to which certain survey 
items measure civic and ethnic identity especially in some of the newer democracies of Central and Eastern 
Europe (see footnote 7).  
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aggregate patterns are similar to country-level results in studies like the European Social 
Survey (available from www.europeansocialsurvey.org, last accessed 7 August 2015), 
indicating that they are not likely to be unusual.  
 
In some ways the national identity descriptive statistics conform to expectations, based on 
existing research on the meaning of national identity in many European countries (e.g., 
Brubaker 1992). For instance, French policy and tradition is often thought to emphasize the 
civic component of national identity, and the Eurobarometer statistics regarding emphasis on 
civic characteristics indicate that this is indeed important to Frenchmen and –women. 
However, the French are certainly not the strongest in terms of emphasis on civic 
characteristics nor the weakest on emphasis on the more exclusive characteristics. Instead, 
several of the Scandinavian countries have citizens who on average lean more towards civic 
identity and less toward exclusive identity. It should be added that responses to the option of 
sharing cultural traditions (not shown here) reveal that the French are the strongest supporters 
of the idea that being French means sharing French cultural traditions (similar results are 
found in ISSP 2003 data; data downloaded from http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp, last 
accessed and analysed 20 November 2014), illustrating a clear emphasis on culture as well as 
participatory civic activity. Similarly, the German results provide mixed support for the 
notion that people in this country emphasize ethnicity and long-term connections: Germans 
are far from being the group that emphasizes exclusive characteristics the most—Britain, 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Austria, and Portugal all have higher means on the exclusive 
ascriptive characteristics scale (this is true if one examines the ISSP survey, too)—and the 
civic identity mean for Germany is certainly not the lowest shown here. Finally, the British 
results illustrate that this country does not fit the general typology at all. British identity is 
often argued to be based on civic notions of identity, and yet the mean score for civic identity 
20 
 
in the EB results is relatively low for Britain while the mean score for exclusive identity is 
relatively high. (Inspection of ISSP data also reveals a strong emphasis on shared ancestry 
and cultural traditions in the UK.) That is, Britain appears to be closer to the ethno-cultural 
model that Germany would normally be said to fit than to the allegedly more civic French 
model. These results are consistent with Tilley, Exley and Heath’s (2004) results for Britain. 
 
Finally, turning to the measure of our contextual variable, government migrant policy, we 
have argued that official government policy regarding the treatment of migrants and 
immigrant-origin minorities is likely to be relevant in understanding the relationship between 
national identity and political trust. There are several potential measures of official treatment 
of immigrant-origin minorities, and in our previous analyses we have investigated both 
Banting and Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI) and the EU’s Migrant 
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and the results are virtually identical to one another. Here, 
we use the EU’s Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) because of the wider range of 
components included compared to the MPI. Specifically, MIPEX investigates the following 
dimensions of official legislation regarding immigrant-origin minorities: 
-Labour market mobility, including access to public and private employment, access to public 
employment services, social security, equal working conditions, and membership in trade 
unions (or equivalent); 
-Family reunion rights, including pre-entry language requirements, economic resources and 
accommodation requirements, and security of the status of family members; 
-Political participation, including rights to vote in elections at various levels of government, 
the right to association, the existence of consultative bodies of foreign residents; 
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-Provisions for long-term residence, including the required time of habitual residence for 
obtaining the right to long-term residence, language requirements for long term residence, 
security of status; 
-Access to nationality, including eligibility for first generation migrations, for spouses or 
partners, the conditions for acquisition of nationality such as language requirements 
(including costs of language training or exams), citizenship tests, costs of citizenship, and 
security of status once citizenship is granted; 
-Anti-discrimination policies and enforcement mechanisms  
(see http://www.mipex.eu/, last accessed 4 April 2016).
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Thus, MIPEX includes many of the components of multiculturalism policy identified by 
Banting and colleagues in their Multiculturalism Policy Index, which as noted above, is 
designed to measure policies that ‘extend some level of public recognition and support for 
ethnocultural minorities to maintain and express their distinct identities and practices’ 
(Banting and Kymlicka 2006: 1). MIPEX also includes further components of inclusion such 
as access to citizenship, and labour and family reunification rights. The components of the 
MIPEX are strongly related to one another (average inter-item Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient is 0.45, Cronbach’s alpha is 0.81) and form a single factor in a principal 
components analysis. We thus report results using the overall MIPEX score, which is the 
average score for each country across the six indicators mentioned above, with each indicator 
receiving equal weight; high values represent more migrant-inclusive integration policies—
i.e., policies that make it easier for newcomers to become part of the national political and 
economic systems (the theoretical range of the scale is 0-100). Because our argument 
emphasizes the potential effect of incorporation of immigrant-origin minorities in national 
                                                          
10
 The analysis here uses the 2007 MIPEX because it comes prior to the fieldwork for the individual-level data.  
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political systems, we also provide an analysis specifically of the components of the index that 
measure political participation and access to nationality.  
 
We acknowledge that some are critical of the EU’s normative aim in funding the 
development of the MIPEX measure—i.e., that it is an attempt on the part of the EU to 
encourage a certain vision of ‘best practice’ when it comes to the treatment of immigrant-
origin minorities—but contend that the indicators themselves are likely to provide valid and 
reliable measures of the official treatment of immigrants and immigrant-origin minorities. To 
create MIPEX, ‘independent scholars and practitioners in migration law, education and anti-
discrimination filled out the score for each indicator based on the country’s publicly available 
documents’; the list of coders is available at http://www.mipex.eu/profile-researchers-experts 
(last accessed 4 April 2016).  Again, we have also investigated the relationships outlined 
above using the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI) designed by academics Keith Banting 
and Will Kymlicka (http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/, last accessed 4 April 2016), and the 
relationships shown in the figures in this paper based on the MIPEX are almost identical to 
those produced using the MPI. This is not surprising, as the correlation between the 2007 
MIPEX (used here) and the 2000 MPI is 0.62 (Pearson correlation coefficient).
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The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) average scores (see Table 1) indicate that 
countries like Austria, Greece and Great Britain—on average—tend to have policies that 
make it relatively more difficult for migrants to become incorporated into the socio-political 
system while Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Portugal have policies that allow for 
relatively easier incorporation. MIPEX scores on access to political participation are 
relatively low in Greece and Austria and high in Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands 
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 The 2010 MPI and 2007 MIPEX are even more strongly correlated, at 0.67. 
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and Portugal. The scores on the access to citizenship part of the index indicate that Austria, 
Greece, Denmark and Italy make such access relatively difficult while Sweden, Belgium, and 
Portugal make access relatively easy. The UK also appears to provide relatively easier access 
to citizenship, while Germany leans towards the other end of the spectrum. This is consistent 
with the findings of scholarly research on citizenship policy in these countries (e.g., Howard 
2009). We now turn to our analysis of the impact of national identity and government migrant 
policy on perceptions of national political institutions. 
 
National Identity, Migrant Policy and Political Trust: The Multivariate Analysis and 
Findings 
It is important to note the structure of our data before turning to our analysis and findings. 
Individuals are nested within countries, creating potential problems of underestimation of 
standard errors if this fact is not taken into consideration. Moreover, a variance components 
analysis indicates that 14 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable is at the country-
level (Level 2 in the analysis below), and this is statistically significant. We will also be 
examining cross-level interactions; we therefore use multilevel modelling to investigate our 
propositions (see Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  
 
We begin by examining the impact of emphasis on differing aspects of national identity on 
political trust before introducing the potential moderating effects of policy regarding 
immigrant-origin minorities. Model 1 of Table 2 shows the coefficients for the model of 
political trust that omits any interactive effects.
12
 (Control variables included in the models 
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 Questions may be raised about whether regions that are known to hold regional identities, such as Catalonia, 
the Basque Country, Scotland, Wales, and the regions of Belgium have any impact on the results here. We have 
investigated the results shown in Table 2 with dummy variables included for these regions, and this had very 
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are discussed in the Web Appendix.) The estimated effect of national identity on political 
trust shown here indicates that people who subscribe the strongest to civic national identity 
(+2 on our index), on average, would have a score on the 0-10 trust scale that is 
approximately 0.76 points higher than those who appear to subscribe the strongest to 
ascriptive national identity (-2 on our index). Thus, there is some evidence to indicate that 
civic identifiers are more positive about national political institutions than acriptive 
identifiers (see also Berg and Hjerm 2010; McLaren 2015). Note that the results when indices 
for civic and ascriptive identity are included in two separate models are largely similar 
(results shown in the Web Appendix Table 2).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Our arguments above pointed to the importance of government policy towards newcomers as 
playing a key role in moderating the relationship between national identity and political trust. 
Model 1 of Table 2 includes our average indicator of government policy—the average 
MIPEX score for each country—in the individual model. The coefficient for this variable is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
little impact on the coefficients shown in the table. None of these dummy variables was statistically significant, 
except for Catalonia, where—interestingly—people in Catalonia, on average, had more positive perceptions of 
the Spanish political system than excluded regions.  
 We also re-ran the analysis in Table 2 for those respondents in the above mentioned regions (N=1233) 
and found that the coefficients for the characteristics of national identity emphasized were not statistically 
significant in these models. 
 We then re-ran the analysis omitting Belgium from the model and found that an emphasis on ascriptive 
characteristics was associated with more negative perceptions of the political system, as is the case for the 
pooled sample used in the main analyses here. Though a full-scale regional analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper, this is clearly an area for exploration in future research.  
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not statistically significant and so there is no evidence that policies towards newcomers are 
themselves undermining political trust. The subsequent models in Table 2 then add the 
interaction between national identity and migrant integration policy—the latter first as an 
index and then using the separate participation and citizenship components of the index. All 
of these interactive coefficients are statistically significant. Figures 1-3 illustrate the 
maximum size of the combined effects of national identity and migrant integration policy on 
political trust, controlling for other variables as shown in Table 2 (and discussed in the Web 
Appendix).
13
   
 
[Figures 1-3 about here] 
 
The results shown in the figures indicate that our expectations for the effects of national 
identity are largely supported. Trust is lowest where migrant policy is relatively inclusive but 
the individual emphasizes more exclusive national identity.  Trust is somewhat higher where 
migrant policy is less inclusive towards migrants but the individual emphasizes the relatively 
more inclusive civic identity and also where the where migrant policy is less inclusive 
towards migrants and the individual emphasizes exclusive identity. Trust is highest when the 
policy towards migrants is inclusive and the individual emphasizes inclusive civic identity. 
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 The results reported in Table 2 are from a fixed effects model. We have investigated a random effects model 
in which the slopes for national identity are allowed to vary. The results indicate that the slopes do indeed vary 
significantly across countries (p=0.005). Examining the coefficients for the model that includes random slopes, 
however, it appears that the overall conclusion that would be drawn from this model is similar to that for the 
fixed effects model. As there are very limited degrees of freedom at Level 2 and the need to estimate a further 
parameter to account for random slopes reduces these degrees of freedom, we report the fixed effects model 
here. The random effects model is reported in Web Appendix Table 4.  
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For the MIPEX index results, the difference between the least trusting condition and the most 
trusting is slightly more than one point on the ten-point trust index.
14
  
 
Our argument about the effect of national identity constructions on perceptions of political 
institutions revolves around incompatibility between individual constructions of national 
identity and official nationality policy as it is applied to migrants. The analyses thus far 
support the propositions outlined above. Our argument also stipulated that one of the reasons 
for distrust in political institutions is likely to be that these institutions now incorporate 
newcomers to a greater or lesser degree. One of the components of the MIPEX indicator is 
immigrant incorporation specifically through political participation, which includes the right 
to vote in local and regional elections after a relatively short waiting period, freedom of 
association, public funding for immigrant organizations, and immigrant-origin minority 
consultative bodies. If our propositions are correct, we would expect individuals who 
emphasize the more exclusive, ascriptive characteristics of identity (parentage and birthplace) 
but live in countries where government policies are encouraging immigrant political 
incorporation to have relatively lower levels of trust in their government institutions while 
those who view the route to becoming a country-national as being through active 
participation would feel more positive about a government that makes this possible. Model 3 
of Table 2 investigates this proposition and the effects as shown in Figure 2 largely support 
the argument. 
 
We can also examine the interactive effects of emphasis on exclusive or inclusive identity 
with the ease of acquiring nationality. Again, we would expect individuals who emphasize 
lengthier connections to the country but who live in countries where such connections are not 
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 Robustness checks are outlined in the Web Appendix.  
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required for becoming a country national to be less positive about their political systems as a 
result, while those who emphasize the more civic aspects of identity and who live in a 
country where exercising these is made possible in part by ease of incorporation as full 
country-nationals would be more positive about their political systems. Model 4 of Table 2 
investigates these propositions and Figure 3 illustrates the interactive effects. Again, the 
relationships are in the expected direction, though it should be noted that in this case, trust is 
highest where the individual emphasizes exclusive ascriptive identity and lives in a country 
that makes citizen acquisition more difficult, with the opposite set of conditions producing a 
slightly lower level of trust—though still higher than when the individual emphasizes 
ascriptive identity but lives in a policy environment that makes citizen acquisition relatively 
easier. We now turn to the conclusion to discuss the implications of these findings. 
 
Conclusion 
Predictions from early seminal research by scholars like Easton (1957, 1965) and Almond 
and Verba (1963) were that national identity should help to build some degree of support for 
political institutions. Such predictions failed to take into account the impact that large-scale 
immigration was likely to have on solidifying how individuals perceive their national 
identities and how such perceptions would translate into support for political institutions. 
 
We show here that when individuals emphasize exclusive, ascriptive characteristics like place 
of birth or parentage, and when official policy also takes a fairly exclusive approach to 
newcomers, individuals are more positive about their political institutions. That is, at least in 
the European context, it is possible that one of the factors producing a decline in trust in 
political institutions in some places is the failure of government policy to reflect the 
nationality preferences of citizens when it comes to newcomers.  
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On the other hand, the evidence presented points to the possibility that when governments 
can convince their citizens of the importance of emphasizing civic aspects of national 
identity—particularly participatory aspects—such an emphasis may help these governments 
to maintain a generally more positive image amongst mass publics in the long term. This may 
be because such an approach more accurately reflects the reality of the modern European 
state, which is that these countries are countries of immigration and that citizens and political 
systems have little choice but to eventually adapt their identity constructions to this reality. 
Where citizens have already done this, they are indeed more positive about their political 
systems, especially when the national legal context is one that is generally more welcoming 
towards migrants. This would imply that a reconstruction of national identities which focuses 
on civic aspects of identity may help to eventually rebuild political trust in the modern mass-
immigration states of Europe where trust is currently relatively limited. 
 
The findings here suggest a connection between national identity and trust in national 
political institutions. Future research could, however, attempt to determine more definitively 
the nature of this connection. For instance, how do national identity and perceptions of 
political institutions feed into one another? Such an analysis would require improved survey 
data sets containing items measuring national identity and perceptions of political institutions, 
and ideally would contain a panel component in order to help establish causality. Research on 
the degree to which citizens are aware of the broad outlines of multiculturalism, citizenship, 
and integration policies would also be beneficial, as this paper and others (e.g., Weldon 2006; 
Wright 2011a; Citrin, Levy and Wright 2014) have shown such policies to be of likely 
relevance to public attitudes. However, we believe the findings presented here suggest the 
existence of a significant connection between national identity and perceptions of political 
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institutions in ways that are rather different than might have been predicted by seminal 
research on these topics, given the new context of large-scale immigration.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Political Trust 
Exclusive-
Inclusive (-2 to 
+2) National 
Identity Scale 
Inclusive (Civic) 
Identity: Vote/ 
Participation/ 
(0-2)  
Exclusive 
(Ascriptive) 
Identity: 
Birthplace/ 
Parentage (0-2) N MIPEX 
MIPEX 
Access to 
Nationality 
MIPEX 
Access to 
Political 
Participation 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
  
  
Austria  6.03 3.68 -0.29 0.86 0.20 0.42 0.49 0.61 904 34 22 34 
Belgium  3.69 3.79 -0.15 0.86 0.23 0.46 0.37 0.60 953 57 71 57 
Denmark  7.02 3.34 0.23 0.85 0.46 0.54 0.23 0.47 988 55 33 55 
Finland  5.60 3.58 -0.20 0.81 0.22 0.44 0.41 0.54 949 81 44 81 
France  3.39 3.13 0.12 0.94 0.41 0.58 0.29 0.54 1013 52 54 52 
Germany  4.47 3.71 -0.19 0.85 0.22 0.43 0.42 0.60 1475 66 38 66 
United 
Kingdom  2.71 3.01 -0.31 0.95 0.22 0.48 0.53 0.66 942 46 62 46 
Greece 3.03 3.50 -0.38 0.84 0.15 0.37 0.53 0.64 969 14 25 14 
Ireland  3.16 3.50 -0.44 0.90 0.16 0.43 0.60 0.66 884 59 62 59 
Italy  3.18 3.66 -0.23 0.83 0.20 0.43 0.43 0.58 953 55 33 55 
Netherlands 5.54 3.85 0.18 0.91 0.43 0.59 0.25 0.50 955 80 51 80 
Portugal  3.10 3.44 -0.56 0.82 0.10 0.33 0.65 0.66 828 79 69 79 
Spain  3.58 3.69 -0.46 0.80 0.12 0.35 0.58 0.61 985 50 41 50 
Sweden  5.98 3.45 0.41 0.83 0.57 0.56 0.16 0.42 1029 93 71 93 
Average 4.35 3.78 -0.15 0.90 0.27 0.49 0.42 0.60 13827 57 49 62 
Note: see paper text and Web Appendix for discussion of all variables and scales shown here. 
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Table 2. National Identity and Political Trust, Multivariate, Multilevel analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
b SE p b SE p b SE p b SE p 
National identity (ascriptive-civic scale) 0.19 0.03 0.000 -0.71 0.15 0.000 -0.39 0.10 0.000 -0.24 0.10 0.021 
Control Variables             
Life satisfaction 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 
Perception of national economic situation 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 
Perception of personal job situation -0.01 0.03 0.852 -0.00 0.03 0.917 -0.00 0.03 0.885 -0.00 0.03 0.891 
Perception of household financial situation 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 
Perception of country's employment situation 0.32 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 
Perception of environmental situation in country 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 
Expectations for life in general -0.06 0.06 0.328 -0.06 0.06 0.324 -0.07 0.06 0.288 -0.06 0.06 0.324 
Expectations for the economic situation in the country 0.39 0.05 0.000 0.40 0.05 0.000 0.49 0.05 0.000 0.40 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for the financial situation of your household 0.07 0.07 0.300 0.07 0.06 0.290 0.07 0.06 0.258 0.07 0.06 0.300 
Expectations for the employment situation in the country 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for personal job situation -0.02 0.07 0.809 -0.01 0.07 0.881 -0.01 0.07 0.835 -0.01 0.07 0.876 
Left-right self-placement 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.000 
Education 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.000 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 
Female -0.19 0.06 0.000 -0.18 0.06 0.001 -0.19 0.06 0.000 -0.18 0.06 0.000 
Rural -0.13 0.07 0.074 -0.12 0.07 0.088 -0.12 0.07 0.095 -0.13 0.07 0.080 
Small town -0.01 0.04 0.735 -0.01 0.04 0.733 -0.01 0.04 0.773 -0.01 0.04 0.723 
Social self-placement 0.11 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 
Migrant Policy and Interactions             
Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX) -0.01 0.01 0.341 -0.01 0.01 0.359  --  
 
-- 
 
MIPEX participation  --   --  0.004 0.01 0.661  --  
MIPEX acquisition of nationality  --   --   --  -0.02 0.01 0.089 
MIPEX*national identity 
 
-- 
 
0.02 0.00 0.000  --  
 
-- 
 
MIPEX participation* identity 
 
-- 
  
-- 
 
0.01 0.00 0.000 
 
-- 
 
MIPEX acquisition of nationality* identity 
 
-- 
  
-- 
  
-- 
 
0.009 0.002 0.000 
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Intercept -0.04 0.88 0.965 -0.11 0.87 0.905 -1.13 0.63 0.099 -0.00 0.57 0.998 
Level 1 variance 
 
10.79 
  
10.76 
  
10.76 
  
10.77 
 
Level 2 variance 
 
0.49 
 
  0.47 
 
  0.51     0.40   
Level 1 variance explained (%)  13.8   14.0   14.0   13.9  
Level 2 variance explained (%)  75.7    76.7    74.7    80.1  
Level 1 N=13,827; coefficients are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and p-values produced in HLM software. See Web Appendix for measures of 
all variables included in the models. The variance components with no variables in the models are as follows: Level 1 variance, 12.511, Level 2 variance, 
2.014 
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Figure 1. Political Trust, MIPEX and National Identity, Illustration of Interactive Effects (MIPEX 
Index) 
 
Note: Figure created by substituting values into Model 2 of Table 1 to derive estimated levels of 
political trust. For instance, the score for the 75th percentile on the MIPEX scale (68) and the value 
representing the greatest ascriptive identity (-2) were substituted into Model 2 (with all other 
variables held to their means) to create the top set of bars (including lower and upper confidence 
intervals), the bars below this were created by substituting the score for the 25th percentile on the 
MIPEX scale (51) and the value representing the greatest civic identity (+2) into Model 2, and so on.  
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Inclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Inclusive Civic ID
Exclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Exclusive Ascriptive ID
Exclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Inclusive Civic ID
Inclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Exclusive Ascriptive ID
Lower 95% CI
Predicted Value
Upper 95% CI
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Figure 2. Political Trust, MIPEX, and National Identity, Illustration of Interactive Effects 
(Participation Component of Index) 
 
Note: Figure created by substituting values into Model 3 of Table 1 to derive estimated levels of 
Political Trust. For instance, the score for the 75th percentile on the MIPEX  participation scale (79) 
and the value representing the greatest ascriptive identity (-2) were substituted into Model 3 (with 
all other variables held to their means) to create the top set of bars (including lower and upper 
confidence intervals),  the bars below this were created by substituting the score for the 25th 
percentile on the MIPEX  participation scale (49) and the value representing the greatest civic 
identity (+2) into Model 3, and so on.  
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Inclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Inclusive Civic ID
Exclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Exclusive Ascriptive ID
Exclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Inclusive Civic ID
Inclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Exclusive Ascriptive ID
Lower 95% CI
Predicted Value
Upper 95% CI
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Figure 3. Political Trust, MIPEX, and National Identity, Illustration of Interactive Effects (Acquisition 
of Citizenship Component of Index) 
 
Note: Figure created by substituting values into Model 4 of Table 1 to derive estimated levels of 
political trust. For instance, the score for the 75th percentile on the MIPEX  citizenship scale (65) and 
the value representing the greatest ascriptive identity (-2) were substituted into Model 4 (with all 
other variables held to their means) to create the top bars (including lower and upper confidence 
intervals), the bars below this were created by substituting the score for the 25th percentile on the 
MIPEX  citizenship scale (33) and the value representing the greatest civic identity (+2) into Model 4, 
and so on. 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Inclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Inclusive Civic ID
Exclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Exclusive Ascriptive ID
Exclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Inclusive Civic ID
Inclusive Migrant Policy, Individual
Emphasises Exclusive Ascriptive ID
Lower 95% CI
Predicted Value
Upper 95% CI
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Web Appendix 
 
Measurement of National Identity 
As mentioned in the text of the paper, our indicators of the aspects of national identity that 
individuals emphasize are less than ideal, in that they do not allow us to use normal scaling 
techniques to investigate which items might fit together empirically to form differing 
individual-level constructs of national identity. The pilot study mentioned in the paper was 
not carried out specifically to validate the Eurobarometer items used here but instead was 
originally designed to investigate a series of survey-based experiments. However, many of 
the items that appear in the EB used for the analysis in the paper and items that appear in the 
International Social Survey Programme’s module on national identity were included in that 
pilot study, and though the survey is not fielded amongst a representative sample—it was 
conducted amongst a convenience sample of 1328 UK university students using online 
platform Qualtrics—we believe it is still useful in investigating whether items fit together 
empirically as we would expect based on existing literature. The national identity portion of 
that questionnaire is as follows:  
 
People have a lot of different ideas about what it means to be British. What is your view? 
How important do you think each of the following is for someone to be considered truly 
British? 
 Very 
Important 
Quite 
Important 
Not 
Important 
Not 
Important 
at all 
Don’t Know 
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Having British citizenship      
Being born in Britain      
Living in Britain for most of 
one’s life 
     
Having at least one British 
parent 
     
Being able to speak English      
Having British ancestry      
Participating in politics, for 
instance by voting in 
elections 
     
Being active in an 
association or organisation 
in Britain 
     
Shared cultural heritage      
Accepting British values      
Feeling British      
 
Factor Analysis 1 in Appendix Table 1 shows the results of an analysis of the above items 
that come closest to the EB items. The results show that, as expected, being born in the 
country, living most of one’s life in the country, and parentage appear to fit together into a 
common construct of national identity. Speaking English and sharing cultural heritage load 
onto this factor as well, but more weakly. This is consistent with other empirical and 
theoretical literature that notes the ambiguity of these latter items when it comes to the 
ascriptive/ethnic versus non-ascriptive/civic construct (see, for instance, Shulman 2002). 
Emphasis on feeling British loads very weakly onto both factors. Factor Analysis 2 in the 
same table therefore omits feeling British and adds the ancestry item, which was included in 
our pilot study. As shown in the factor analysis results, this item loads onto the same factor as 
birthplace, parentage, and having lived most of one’s life in the country, indicating that the 
items do likely form a general ascriptive/ethnic construct. The loading for the culture item 
seems to indicate that this may fit within the same construct, though more weakly than some 
of the other items. In both of the factor analysis results, participating in politics and being 
active in an association clearly load onto a second factor.  
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In order to carry out the multivariate analyses discussed in the main text of the paper, we 
investigated different ways of combining the EB items to make the results for different 
national identity constructs as comparable as possible. Because we only have two items that 
are clearly civic in nature in the EB, it seemed reasonable to try to narrow our 
ascriptive/ethnic items down to two as well. Because birthplace and parentage clearly loaded 
most strongly with ancestry in the second factor analysis in our pilot study, we focus on these 
as our indicators of exclusive ascriptive/ethnic identity. Initially, we created two separate 
indices—an inclusive, non-ascriptive/civic index that includes the two participation-oriented 
items and an exclusive, ascriptive/ethnic index that includes emphasis on parentage and 
birthplace. The results using these two separate indices, each with a range of 0-2, are shown 
in Appendix Tables 2 and 3. Note that in these analyses, each index has been entered into 
separate regression equations—i.e., they are not both included in the same regression 
simultaneously due to concerns about multicollinearity. The interactive effects are shown in 
Appendix Figures 1-3.  
 
For the main text of the paper, we have combined the items to create a single national identity 
index. For this index, individuals who mentioned both parentage and birthplace were given a 
score of -2, those who mentioned one or the other were given a score of -1, those who 
mentioned both of the participation items were given a score of +2 and those who mentioned 
one of these were given a score of +1. Individuals who happened to have chosen one 
participation and one ascriptive/ethnic item were omitted from the analysis (182 respondents, 
or 1% of the entire sample). Those who chose none of the participation or ascriptive/ethnic 
items were scored 0. Thus, the scale ranges from -2 to +2 (exclusive/ascriptive/ethnic to 
inclusive/non-ascriptive/civic). 
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Robustness and Omitted Variables Investigations  
For robustness checks, we investigated the Q-Q Plots of residual values resulting from our 
multilevel analyses, and these initially indicated that Britain was an outlier. We thus re-ran 
our analyses without Britain and the results are similar to those that included Britain (see 
Table A, Model 1 at the end of this file). Once Britain was removed, Austria, Sweden and 
Denmark appeared to be outliers, and so the analysis was re-run without these countries and 
without Britain. These results appear in Table A, Model 2. We also examined residual 
standard deviation from the final fitted fixed effect model, and Denmark, Germany, Spain, 
Finland, France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden appeared to have relatively extreme 
standard deviations. We thus re-ran our model on this sample of countries only. These results 
appear in Table A, Model 3. All of the models indicate virtually identical effects across these 
varying groups of countries, and these effects are similar to those reported in the paper.  
 
In terms of potential omitted variables, scatterplots of residuals against potentially important 
independent variables--expenditure on social protection (available from Eurostat) and World 
Bank governance score--indicate that these might be significant omitted variables in our 
models. We therefore re-ran our models (with all countries included), and the nature of the 
relationship between national identity, MIPEX and trust remains the same. Results are shown 
in Table B.  
 
Potential nonlinearity appeared in scatterplots of residuals plotted against governance scores 
and social protection expenditure. We thus attempted to include social protection and social 
protection squared in one model and governance scores and governance scores squared in a 
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separate model. Unfortunately, the model that included social protection squared could not be 
run because of multicollinearity among the model predictors. The model that included 
governance squared scores did run, and the interaction between national identity and MIPEX 
remains significant even controlling for these omitted variables. These results are shown in 
Table B, Model 3. Given our very limited Level 2 degrees of freedom and multicollinearity at 
Level 2, in the resubmitted paper, we have presented the models without these additional 
predictors. 
 
 
Control Variables Included in the Multivariate Analyses 
Although the data set used in the analyses in this paper does not contain the full range of 
variables related to perceptions of political systems that we might like to include as controls, 
it does contain quite a few that are useful to help ensure that any relationships found here are 
not spuriously driven by other factors. For instance, as noted in the text of the paper, some 
research on perceptions of political systems indicates that perceptions of government 
economic performance and perceptions of one’s own household economic situation are likely 
to be relevant (e.g., Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Miller 
and Listhaug 1990, 1999; Weil 1989; Weatherford 1992; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Mishler 
and Rose 1997, 2001; Rohrschneider 2005; Anderson and Tverdova 2003). Eurobarometer 
71.3 contains a wide range of variables measuring these perceptions, and these are included 
as controls here. We also control for life satisfaction as an indicator of general pessimism, 
which may be connected to negative perceptions of political institutions (McLaren 2012), 
social class, left-right self-placement, education, age, gender and the size of the town in 
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which the respondent lives.1 The measures of these control variables are provided below. Our 
previous analyses also incorporated a control for quality of governance, using the World 
Bank’s Governance indicators, and incorporation of this variable did not affect the 
relationships investigated here. Due to the limited degrees of freedom at the country-level, we 
therefore omit this variable from the analyses. The measures of our control variables are as 
follows. 
 
Economic Expectations: What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the 
next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...? The economic situation 
in (OUR COUNTRY); The financial situation of your household; The employment situation 
in (OUR COUNTRY); Your personal job situation. Better, Worse, Same. 
Perception of Current Economy and Economic Circumstances: How would you judge the 
current situation in each of the following? The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy; 
Your personal job situation; The financial situation of your household; The employment 
situation in (OUR COUNTRY). Very good, rather good, rather bad, very bad. 
 
All of the above items were coded such that high values represent more positive perceptions 
of economic circumstances.  
                                                          
1 Unfortunately, this EB does not include an indicator of how the respondent voted in the last election, and so 
we are not able to control for the electoral winner effect identified by Anderson and colleagues (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2001; Anderson and Lo Tempio 2002); it also does not contain an indicator of social capital, which 
has also been shown to be connected to political trust (e.g., Zmerli and Newton 2008). As mentioned in the text 
of the paper, in previous analyses we did investigate our propositions using the European Values Study 2008, 
which does contain these indicators (though not the range of economic perceptions contained in the EB used 
here), and the conclusions drawn from those results are very similar to those reported here. 
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Perceptions of other current issues: The following item appears in the same group as the 
above items: The situation of the environment in (OUR COUNTRY). Very good, rather 
good, rather bad, very bad. 
Life Satisfaction: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or 
not at all satisfied with the life you lead? Very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, not 
all satisfied. 
Expectations for Life in Future: What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will 
the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...? Your life in 
general. Better, Worse, Same. 
Level in Society: On the following scale, step ‘1’ corresponds to ‘the lowest level in the 
society’; step ‘10’ corresponds to ‘the highest level in the society’. Could you tell me on 
which step you would place yourself? 1 The lowest level in the society…10 The highest level 
in the society. 
 
All of these were coded such that high values represent more positive perceptions of 
circumstances.  
 
Left-Right Self-Placement: In political matters people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How 
would you place your views on this scale (1 Left; 10 Right).  
Education: How old were you when you stopped full-time education? Those who are still 
studying were recoded such that their education was their current age. 
Age: How old are you? 
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Size of town: Would you say you live in a...? Rural area or village, Small or middle sized 
town, Large town. Large town is the omitted category for the analysis here.  
Gender: coded by interviewer. 
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Appendix Table 1. Factor Analysis Results (Rotated Component Matrix) 
 
Factor Analysis 1 Factor Analysis 2 
1 2 1 2 
Important to have been born in Britain 0.823 -0.042 0.813 -0.038 
Important to have lived in Britain most of one’s life 0.731 0.068 0.636 0.075 
Important to have at least one British parent 0.793 0.028 0.843 0.003 
Important to have be able to speak English 0.575 0.261 0.521 0.278 
Important to participate in politics -0.006 0.821 0.016 0.847 
Important to belong to an association in Britain 0.087 0.838 0.132 0.834 
Important to have shared cultural heritage 0.581 0.353 0.626 0.307 
Important to feel British 0.246 0.282 -- -- 
Important to have British ancestry -- -- 0.796 0.055 
Eigenvalue 2.577 1.656 3.090 1.594 
Percent of Variance Explained 32.2 20.7 38.6 19.9 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. N=1328.   
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Appendix Table 2. National Identity and Political Trust, Multivariate, Multilevel analysis, Civic and Ascriptive Identity Entered Separately 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
b SE p b SE p b SE p b SE p 
National Identity Variables             
Emphasize inclusive/ civic characteristics 0.05 0.01 0.000  --  -0.20 0.05 0.000  --  
Emphasize exclusive/ ascriptive characteristics  --  -0.04 0.01 0.002  --  0.11 0.04 0.011 
Control Variables             
Life satisfaction 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 
Perception of national economic situation 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 
Perception of personal job situation -0.01 0.03 0.842 -0.01 0.03 0.835 -0.00 0.03 0.903 -0.01 0.03 0.860 
Perception of household financial situation 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 
Perception of country's employment situation 0.33 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 0.33 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 
Perception of environmental situation in country 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 
Expectations for life in general -0.06 0.06 0.321 -0.06 0.06 0.330 -0.06 0.06 0.345 -0.07 0.06 0.292 
Expectations for the economic situation in the country 0.39 0.05 0.000 0.40 0.05 0.000 0.39 0.05 0.000 0.40 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for the financial situation of your household 0.06 0.07 0.321 0.07 0.07 0.297 0.06 0.06 0.327 0.07 0.07 0.287 
Expectations for the employment situation in the country 0.21 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for personal job situation -0.02 0.07 0.750 -0.01 0.07 0.855 -0.02 0.07 0.773 -0.01 0.07 0.909 
Left-right self-placement 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.09 0.01 0.000 0.08 0.02 0.000 
Education 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.000 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 
Female -0.18 0.06 0.001 -0.18 0.06 0.001 -0.19 0.06 0.001 -0.18 0.06 0.000 
Rural -0.13 0.07 0.073 -0.13 0.07 0.072 -0.13 0.07 0.052 -0.13 0.07 0.077 
Small town -0.01 0.04 0.716 -0.01 0.04 0.696 -0.01 0.04 0.735 -0.01 0.04 0.693 
Social self-placement 0.12 0.02 0.000 0.12 0.02 0.000 0.12 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 
Migrant Policy and Interactions             
Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX) -0.01 0.01 0.362 -0.01 0.01 0.353 -0.02 0.01 0.126 -0.01 0.01 0.612 
MIPEX* inclusive/ civic identity 
 
-- 
  
-- 
 
0.004 0.001 0.000 
 
-- 
 
MIPEX*exclusive/ascriptive identity 
 
-- 
  
-- 
  
-- 
 
-0.002 0.00 0.000 
Intercept -0.23 0.89 0.803 -0.01 0.89 0.353 0.33 0.88 0.713 -0.39 0.89 0.670 
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Level 1 variance 
 
10.79 
  
10.80 
  
10.77 
  
10.79 
 
Level 2 variance 
 
0.50 
 
  0.50 
 
  0.48     0.49   
Level 1 variance explained (%)  13.8   13.7   13.9   13.8  
Level 2 variance explained (%)  75.2    75.2    76.2    75.7  
Level 1 N=13,827; coefficients are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and p-values produced in HLM software. See Web Appendix A for measures 
of all variables included in the models. The variance components with no variables in the models are as follows: Level 1 variance, 12.511, Level 2 variance, 
2.014 
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Appendix Table 3. MIPEX Political Participation, Acquisition of Nationality, and National Identity Interactive Effects, Civic and Ascriptive Identity 
Entered Separately 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
b SE p b SE p b SE p b SE p 
National Identity Variables             
Emphasize civic characteristics -0.07 0.01 0.000 
 
-- 
 
-0.06 0.04 0.099  --  
Emphasize ascriptive characteristics 
 
-- 
 
0.08 0.03 0.005  --  0.04 0.03 0.168 
Control Variables             
Life satisfaction 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 
Perception of national economic situation 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 
Perception of personal job situation -0.00 0.03 0.868 -0.01 0.03 0.852 -0.00 0.03 0. 868 -0.01 0.03 0.854 
Perception of household financial situation 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 
Perception of country's employment situation 0.32 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 
Perception of environmental situation in country 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 
Expectations for life in general -0.06 0.06 0.311 -0.07 0.06 0.271 -0.06 0.06 0.332 -0.07 0.06 0.300 
Expectations for the economic situation in the country 0.39 0.05 0.000 0.40 0.05 0.000 0.39 0.05 0.000 0.40 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for the financial situation of your 
household 0.07 0.07 0.310 0.07 0.07 0.263 0.06 0.07 0.331 0.07 0.07 0.292 
Expectations for the employment situation in the 
country 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for personal job situation -0.02 0.07 0.754 -0.01 0.07 0.898 -0.02 0.07 0.788 -0.01 0.07 0.892 
Left-right self-placement 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.08 0.02 0.000 
Education 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.000 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 
Female -0.19 0.06 0.000 -0.19 0.06 0.000 -0.19 0.06 0.001 -0.18 0.06 0.001 
Rural -0.13 0.07 0.074 -0.12 0.07 0.087 -0.13 0.07 0.074 -0.13 0.07 0.077 
Small town -0.01 0.04 0.724 -0.01 0.04 0.720 -0.01 0.04 0.698 -0.01 0.04 0.703 
Social self-placement 0.12 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 
Migrant Policy and Interactions             
Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX)—Political 
Participation 
-
0.0001 0.01 0.926 0.01 0.01 0.384  --   --  
Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX)—Acquisition of 
Nationality       -0.02 0.01 0.041  --  
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MIPEX—Political Participation * civic identity 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 
-- 
 
 --   --  
MIPEX—Political Participation * ascriptive identity 
 
-- 
 
-0.002 0.000 0.000  --   --  
MIPEX Acquisition of Nationality * civic identity  --   --  0.002 0.001 0.000  --  
MIPEX Acquisition of Nationality* ascriptive identity  --   --   --  -0.002 0.001 0.005 
Intercept -0.97 0.64 0.159 -1.35 0.65 0.058 0.13 0.58 0.830 -0.10 0.59 0.872 
Level 1 variance 
 
10.78 
  
10.79 
 
 10.79   10.80  
Level 2 variance 
 
0.52 
  
0.52 
 
 0.40   0.41  
Level 1 variance explained (%)  13.8   13.8   13.8   13.7  
Level 2 variance explained (%)  74.2   74.2   80.1   79.6  
Level 1 N=13,827; coefficients are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and p-values produced in HLM software. See Web Appendix A for measures 
of all variables included in the models. The variance components with no variables in the models are as follows: Level 1 variance, 12.511, Level 2 variance, 
2.014 
 
  
16 
 
Appendix Table 4. National Identity and Political Trust, Multivariate, Multilevel analysis, 
Random Effects Model 
 
b SE p 
National identity (ascriptive-civic scale) -0.70 0.23 0.011 
Control Variables    
Life satisfaction 0.25 0.03 0.000 
Perception of national economic situation 0.51 0.03 0.000 
Perception of personal job situation -0.00 0.03 0.945 
Perception of household financial situation 0.16 0.03 0.000 
Perception of country's employment situation 0.32 0.04 0.000 
Perception of environmental situation in country 0.35 0.03 0.000 
Expectations for life in general -0.06 0.06 0.301 
Expectations for the economic situation in the country 0.40 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for the financial situation of your household 0.07 0.06 0.293 
Expectations for the employment situation in the country 0.20 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for personal job situation -0.01 0.07 0.879 
Left-right self-placement 0.09 0.02 0.000 
Education 0.02 0.01 0.000 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.000 
Female -0.18 0.06 0.001 
Rural -0.12 0.07 0.088 
Small town -0.01 0.04 0.739 
Social self-placement 0.11 0.02 0.000 
Migrant Policy and Interactions    
Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX) -0.01 0.01 0.359 
MIPEX*national identity 0.01 0.00 0.002 
Intercept -0.10 0.87 0.912 
Level 1 variance 
 
10.75 
 
Level 2 variance   0.48 
 
National Identity slope variance  0.02 0.005 
Level 1 variance explained (%)  14.1  
Level 2 variance explained (%)  76.6   
Level 1 N=13,827; coefficients are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and p-values 
produced in HLM software. See Web Appendix A for measures of all variables included in the models. 
The variance components with no variables in the models are as follows: Level 1 variance, 12.511, 
Level 2 variance, 2.014 
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Appendix Table 5. National Identity and Political Trust, Multivariate, Multilevel analysis, Robustness Checks for Outlier Effects 
 Model 1: Britain omitted 
Model 2: Britain, Austria, 
Sweden and Denmark 
omitted 
Model 3: Denmark, 
Germany, Spain, 
Finland, France, the 
Netherlands, Austria and 
Sweden only Model 4: Spain omitted 
 
b SE p b SE p b SE p b SE p 
National identity (ascriptive-civic scale) -0.71 0.15 0.000 -1.00 0.24 0.000 -0.63 0.18 0.000 -0.71 0.15 0.000 
Control Variables             
Life satisfaction 0.26 0.04 0.000 0.21 0.04 0.000 0.36 0.05 0.000 0.28 0.04 0.000 
Perception of national economic situation 0.49 0.03 0.000 0.56 0.04 0.000 0.46 0.04 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 
Perception of personal job situation 0.01 0.03 0.857 -0.02 0.04 0.586 -0.02 0.04 0.581 -0.01 0.03 0.766 
Perception of household financial situation 0.17 0.04 0.000 0.17 0.04 0.000 0.19 0.05 0.000 0.16 0.04 0.000 
Perception of country's employment situation 0.33 0.04 0.000 0.35 0.05 0.000 0.30 0.04 0.000 0.29 0.04 0.000 
Perception of environmental situation in country 0.36 0.03 0.000 0.33 0.03 0.000 0.41 0.04 0.000 0.33 0.03 0.000 
Expectations for life in general -0.07 0.07 0.303 -0.03 0.08 0.668 -0.02 0.08 0.792 -0.08 0.06 0.226 
Expectations for the economic situation in the country 0.41 0.05 0.000 0.36 0.06 0.000 0.45 0.06 0.000 0.40 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for the financial situation of your household 0.06 0.07 0.346 0.03 0.08 0.752 0.08 0.08 0.341 0.08 0.07 0.247 
Expectations for the employment situation in the country 0.17 0.05 0.001 0.23 0.06 0.000 0.12 0.06 0.062 0.20 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for personal job situation -0.00 0.07 0.980 -0.00 0.08 0.962 -0.07 0.09 0.479 -0.00 0.07 0.889 
Left-right self-placement 0.10 0.02 0.000 0.07 0.02 0.000 0.10 0.02 0.000 0.12 0.02 0.000 
Education 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.005 0.03 0.00 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.000 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 
Female -0.18 0.06 0.000 -0.18 0.07 0.008 -0.14 0.07 0.055 -0.20 0.06 0.000 
Rural -0.10 0.08 0.184 -0.11 0.09 0.222 -0.21 0.10 0.028 -0.17 0.08 0.028 
Small town -0.01 0.04 0.822 -0.02 0.05 0.709 -0.05 0.05 0.346 -0.01 0.04 0.761 
Social self-placement 0.12 0.02 0.000 0.13 0.03 0.000 0.13 0.03 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 
Migrant Policy and Interactions             
Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX) -0.01 0.01 0.275 0.00 0.01 0.792 -0.04 0.01 0.190 -0.01 0.01 0.396 
MIPEX*national identity 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.02 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 
Intercept -0.30 0.72 0.680 -1.18 0.81 0.183 -0.04 0.76 0.957 -0.24 0.92 0.793 
Level 1 variance 
 
10.99 
  
11.20 
  
10.87 
 
 10.66  
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Level 2 variance 
 
0.31 
 
  0.16 
 
  0.21    0.53  
Level 1 variance explained (%)  13.9   13.4   14.5   14.2  
Level 2 variance explained (%)  84.1    83.3    87.0    75.1   
N  12,885   9964   8,298   12842  
Coefficients are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and p-values produced in HLM software. See Web Appendix A for measures of all variables 
included in the models. The variance components with no independent variables in the models are as follows: Model 1 Level 1 variance, 12.764, Level 2 
variance, 1.950; Model 2 Level 1 variance, 12.937, Level 2 variance, 0.961; Model 3 Level 1 variance, 12.716, Level 2 variance, 1.609; Model 4 Level 1 
variance, 12.425, Level 2 variance, 2.132. 
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Appendix Table 6. National Identity and Political Trust, Multivariate, Multilevel analysis, Robustness Checks for Omitted Variables 
 
Model 1: Model Including 
Expenditure on Social 
Protection 
Model 2: Model Including 
World Bank Governance 
Scores 
Model 3: Model Including World 
Bank Governance and Squared 
Scores 
 
b SE p b SE p b SE p 
National identity (ascriptive-civic scale) -0.71 0.15 0.000 -0.71 0.15 0.000 -0.70 0.15 0.000 
Control Variables          
Life satisfaction 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 0.25 0.03 0.000 
Perception of national economic situation 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.03 0.000 
Perception of personal job situation -0.00 0.03 0. 916 -0.00 0.03 0. 915 -0.00 0.03 0. 912 
Perception of household financial situation 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.16 0.03 0.000 
Perception of country's employment situation 0.32 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 0.32 0.04 0.000 
Perception of environmental situation in country 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.03 0.000 
Expectations for life in general -0.06 0.06 0.321 -0.06 0.06 0.321 -0.06 0.06 0.317 
Expectations for the economic situation in the country 0.40 0.05 0.000 0.40 0.05 0.000 0.40 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for the financial situation of your household 0.07 0.06 0.290 0.07 0.06 0.290 0.07 0.06 0.287 
Expectations for the employment situation in the country 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 0.20 0.05 0.000 
Expectations for personal job situation -0.01 0.07 0.879 -0.01 0.07 0.880 -0.01 0.07 0.883 
Left-right self-placement 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.000 
Education 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.000 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 
Female -0.18 0.06 0.001 -0.18 0.06 0.001 -0.18 0.06 0.001 
Rural -0.12 0.07 0.086 -0.12 0.07 0.087 -0.12 0.07 0.091 
Small town -0.01 0.04 0.721 -0.01 0.04 0.730 -0.01 0.04 0.732 
Social self-placement 0.11 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 0.11 0.02 0.000 
Expenditure on Social Welfare (Eurostat) 0.00 0.00 0.256  --   --  
World Bank Governance Scores  --  0.68 0.42 0.139 -2.96 2.78 0.312 
World Bank Governance Scores Squared  --   --  1.50 1.13 0.216 
Migrant Policy and Interactions          
Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX) -0.01 0.01 0.484 -0.01 0.01 0.302 -0.01 0.01 0.443 
MIPEX*national identity 0.02 0.00 0.000 0.02 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.000 
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Intercept -1.05 1.16 0.384 -0.94 0.97 0.355 0.78 1.60 0.637 
Level 1 variance 
 
10.76 
  
10.76 
  
10.76 
 
Level 2 variance 
 
0.45 
 
  0.42 
 
  0.39   
Level 1 variance explained (%)  14.0   14.0   14.0  
Level 2 variance explained (%)  77.7    79.1    80.6   
Level 1 N=13,827; coefficients are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and p-values produced in HLM software. See Web Appendix A for measures 
of all variables included in the models. The variance components with no variables in the models are as follows: Level 1 variance, 12.511, Level 2 variance, 
2.014 
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Appendix Figure 1. Political Trust, MIPEX and National Identity, Illustration of Interactive Effects 
(MIPEX Index) 
 
Note: Figure created by substituting values into Models 3 and 4 of Web Appendix Table 2 to derive 
estimated levels of political trust. For instance, the score for the 75th percentile on the MIPEX scale 
(68) and value representing the greatest ascriptive identity (2) were substituted into Model 4 (with 
all other variables held to their means) to create the top set of bars (including lower and upper 
confidence intervals), the bars below this were created by substituting the score for the 25th 
percentile on the MIPEX scale (51) and the value representing the greatest civic identity (2) into 
Model 3, and so on. 
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Appendix Figure 2. Political Trust, MIPEX and National Identity, Illustration of Interactive Effects 
(Participation Component of Index) 
 
Note: Figure created by substituting values into Models 1 and 2 of Web Appendix Table 3 to derive 
estimated levels of political trust. For instance, the score for the 75th percentile on the MIPEX 
participation scale (79) and value representing the greatest ascriptive identity (2) were substituted 
into Model 2 (with all other variables held to their means) to create the top set of bars (including 
lower and upper confidence intervals), the bars below this were created by substituting the score for 
the 25th percentile on MIPEX  participation scale (49) and the value representing the greatest civic 
identity (2) into Model 1, and so on. 
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Emphasises Inclusive Civic ID 
Exclusive Migrant Policy, Individual 
Emphasises Exclusive Ascriptive ID 
Exclusive Migrant Policy, Individual 
Emphasises Inclusive Civic ID 
Inclusive Migrant Policy, Individual 
Emphasises Exclusive Ascriptive ID 
Lower 95% CI 
Predicted Value 
Upper 95% CI 
23 
 
Appendix Figure 3. Political Trust, MIPEX and National Identity, Illustration of Interactive Effects 
(Acquisition of Citizenship Component of Index) 
 
Note: Figure created by substituting values into Models 3 and 4 of Web Appendix Table 3 to derive 
estimated levels of political trust. For instance, the score for the 75th percentile on the MIPEX  
citizenship scale (65) and value representing the greatest ascriptive identity (2) were substituted into 
Model 4 (with all other variables held to their means) to create the top bars (including lower and 
upper confidence intervals), the bars below this were created by substituting the score for the 25th 
percentile on the MIPEX  citizenship scale (33) and the value representing the greatest civic identity 
(2) into Model 3, and so on. 
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